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Sedler: The Supreme Court Will Not Overrule Roe v. Wade

THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT OVERRULE
ROE v. WADE
RobertA. Sedler*
The recent confirmation of two purportedly conservative Justices to
the Supreme Court has fueled media speculation that the Supreme Court
may be "poised to overrule Roe v. Wade."' The speculation has been
fanned by South Dakota's recent enactment of a law banning virtually
all abortions for the stated purpose of getting the Supreme Court to
reconsider Roe.2 The pro-life forces also take encouragement from the
fact that the Court has agreed to hear the government's appeal from
lower court decisions holding unconstitutional Congress's ban on
"partial birth" abortions. 3 Finally, based on the assumption by the prolife forces that there are now four Justices on the Court willing to
overrule Roe (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Alito), the possible retirement of Justice Stevens and his replacement by
a Bush-appointed "pro-life" Justice would ensure the overruling of Roe,
and with it a woman's constitutional right to make the choice to end an
unwanted pregnancy by a safe and legal abortion.4

*

Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956; J.D.,

1959,

University of Pittsburgh. In 1970, while at the University of Kentucky, I litigated the Kentucky
version of Roe v. Wade for the American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky. See Crossen v.
Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971); Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D.
Ky.1972) (three-judge), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973) (remanding for further

consideration in light of Roe v. Wade).
1. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See Monica Davey, South Dakota Bans Abortion, Setting Up a Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2006, at Al.
3. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (Feb. 21,
2006).

4.
Some, including those who led the efforts to pass the ban in South Dakota, said they
considered this the ideal time to return the central question of Roe to the Supreme Court.
State Representative Roger Hunt, who sponsored the bill in South Dakota, pointed to the
appointments of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., both

conservatives, and what he described as the "strong possibility" of the retirement of
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The problem with this scenario is that it is completely wrong. The
Supreme Court will not overrule Roe v. Wade. This is so for two related
reasons, one going to the operation of the Court itself, and the other
going to the value acceptances of American society today.
The Court operates as an institution, and the new Justices, like the
other Justices on the Court, will operate within this institutional
framework.' We can understand the workings of the Court as an
institution by looking to what it has done over a number of years, and we
can assume that what it has done in the past, it will continue to do in the
future.
The most important component in Supreme Court decision-making
is the constitutional doctrine and precedent that has emerged from the
Court's decisions in the different areas of constitutional law over a
period of time. 6 Most of the constitutional cases coming before the Court
today, important as some of them may be in terms of public policy and
societal impact, involve the application of this doctrine and precedent to
particular constitutional questions, some very narrow, arising from new
laws and new kinds of governmental action. 7 While media commentary
(and sometimes academic commentary as well) might suggest that the
Court, particularly as its composition changes, frequently reviews its
major and most controversial decisions, experience indicates that this
indeed is not the case. Although the Court has the power to overrule its
prior decisions and sometimes does so, a longitudinal analysis indicates
that over a period of time comparatively few decisions have been
overruled. 8 Generally, the court will overrule a decision only when its

Justice John Paul Stevens in the near future and the naming of a conservative as his
successor.
Davey, supra note 2.
5. While the Justices' judicial philosophy and views on substantive constitutional law
influence their decisions in particular cases, experience indicates that for the most part they
generally will continue to operate within this institutional framework.
6. While a substantial amount of academic commentary today focuses on constitutional
theory and downplays the significance of constitutional doctrine and precedent, in the real world of
constitutional litigation, there appears to be little room for constitutional theory, and the cases are
litigated within the framework of constitutional doctrine and precedent.
7. It is interesting to note that the result in the Court's recent and highly visible "affirmative
action" cases, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003),
worked no change in the applicable constitutional doctrine and ended up reaffirming the result the
Court had reached a quarter-century before in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). See also Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitution: From Bakke to
Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219 (2003-2004).
8.

See THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 194-

206 tbl.2-17 (Lee Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003). This source lists Supreme Court decisions in all
areas overruled by subsequent decisions from 1789-2002. According to this table, there were 171
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premises have been weakened by subsequent decisions, so that there is a
seeming inconsistency between the older and newer decisions, or when
the Court concludes in retrospect that the decision could not be
supported by the doctrine and precedents on which it was based. 9 The
Court has never overruled a decision, at least not explicitly, on the
ground that the composition of the Court has changed, and a majority of
the present Justices would have decided the case differently had they
been on the Court at the time of the decision.
More importantly for present purposes, the Court has never
overruled a decision recognizing a constitutional liberty interest or for
that matter any other constitutionally-protected interest. The Court has
never held that what is a protected constitutional right today would not
be a protected constitutional right tomorrow. Where the Court has
overruled cases involving constitutional rights, it has been to overrule a
case rejecting a claimed constitutional right and to hold that the claimed
right is indeed protected by the Constitution. 10
Roe v. Wade was a landmark decision, holding that a woman has a
protected liberty interest in making the choice to have a safe and legal
abortion. That decision has been the law of the land for some thirty-three
years. And in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1 the Court expressly affirmed the central
instances in which a Supreme Court decision overruled a prior decision or decisions. Sixteen of
these instances occurred from 1810-1894, and 155 occurred from 1914-2002. While some might
find a few more or a few less overrulings than the authors, the study gives a pretty accurate picture
of the Court's institutional reluctance to overrule prior decisions.
9. See the discussion in Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional
Law, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 173, 175-78 (2002). For example, when the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), effectively overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by holding that there could be no racial segregation in the public
schools, the premises of Plessy and of the "separate but equal" doctrine had been weakened by more
recent decisions holding that racial segregation in law schools and graduate schools was "inherently
unequal" and so unconstitutional. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). It may also be noted that Brown's
overruling of Plessy had the effect of overruling a case rejecting a claimed constitutional right to be
free of state-imposed racial segregation and holding that the claimed right was indeed protected by
the Constitution. See infra note 10.
10. As in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003), where the Court held that the due
process clause protects the right of consenting adults to engage in sex in private, overruling the
contrary holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In that case, the Court also
emphasized that the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick had been eroded by the subsequent cases of
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), holding violative of equal protection a Colorado state
constitutional amendment that prohibited the inclusion of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination
law, and PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), where
the Court expressly affirmed a woman's constitutionally-protected right to make the choice to have
a pre-viability abortion. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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holding of Roe v. Wade, that a woman had a fundamental right to make
the choice to have an abortion prior to the time that the fetus became
viable while permitting only such regulation of the abortion procedure
that it did not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's right to choose
to have an abortion.
In Casey, the Court specifically rejected the argument of the prolife forces, joined in by the first Bush administration, and supported by
four dissenting Justices, that it should overrule Roe v. Wade. The Court
noted that there were no grounds for overruling Roe in terms of its
premises having been weakened by subsequent decisions or its being
12
unsupported by the doctrine and premises on which it was based.
Indeed, the only thing that had changed was the composition of the
Court, and this had never been considered to be a proper ground for
overruling a prior decision. 13
More importantly, in Casey the Court explained why it had never
overruled a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest. As
Justice Kennedy succinctly put it: "In Casey we noted that when a court
is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty
interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty
cautions with particular strength against reversing course."' 14 As the
Court stated in Casey:
Abortion is customarily chosen as an unplanned response to the
consequence of unplanned activity or to the failure of conventional
birth control, and except on the assumption that no intercourse would
have occurred but for Roe's holding, such behavior may appear to
justify no reliance claim....

12. ld.at 855-61.
13. In 1992, the only Justice who had been in the Roe majority who was still on the Court was
Justice Blackmun. The two dissenters in Roe, now Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, were
still on the Court. Justice Stevens, who had been appointed by President Ford, was assumed to be
supportive of Roe. The remaining five Justices on the Court, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
and Thomas, had been appointed by "pro-life" Presidents Reagan and Bush, and the pro-life forces
assumed that at least three of them would vote to overrule Roe. While Justices Scalia and Thomas
did vote to overrule Roe, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, in a joint opinion, voted to
uphold the central holding of Roe that a woman had the fundamental right to make the choice to
have a pre-viability abortion, while changing Roe's approach to the constitutionality of abortion
regulation from a rigid trimester test to a more flexible "undue burden" approach. The latter change
had long been advocated by Justice O'Connor, see her dissenting opinion in Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and the joint
opinion in Casey saw the change as not affecting Roe's central holding. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-76.
14. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
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To eliminate the issue of reliance that easily, however, one would need
to limit cognizable reliance to specific instances of sexual activity. But
to do this would be simply to refuse to face the fact that for two
decades of economic and social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives. The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain
cost of overruling Roe for people who5 have ordered their thinking and
living around that case be dismissed.'
Fourteen more years have elapsed since Casey was decided, and the
reasons set forth by the Court in Casey that "caution with particular
strength against reversing course" apply even more strongly today. The
Supreme Court operates as an institution, and for the Court to overrule
Roe v. Wade today would be completely inconsistent
with the Court's
16
institutional behavior over a long period of time.
The second and related reason why the Court will not overrule Roe
v. Wade today is that this would have a cataclysmic effect on American
society. For large numbers of American women, abortion has become a
fully acceptable way of ending an unwanted pregnancy. Approximately
1.3 million abortions are performed in the United States each year.
Almost 90% of the abortions are performed during the first twelve
weeks, with most being performed during the first nine weeks. Less than
1% of these abortions are performed after twenty-four weeks. In 2002,
the last year for which figures are available, 60% of the women having
abortions were already mothers, which shows that for these women at
least, abortion was a "back-up" for contraception. And, emphasizing the
importance of choice, the figures also show that 53% of the women
having unwanted pregnancies7 chose to continue with their pregnancies
1
rather than have an abortion.
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (emphasis added and citations omitted). As the Court concluded:
"The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe
v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce." Id. at 871.
16. Judge Michael Luttig of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
stated that he understands the Supreme Court to have intended that its decision in Casey to be a
"decision of super-stare decisis with respect to a woman's fundamental right to choose whether or
not to proceed with a pregnancy." Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376 (4th
Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring) (vacating the stay pending appeal).
17. See Alan Guttmacher Inst., Facts in Brief: Induced Abortion in the United States, May 18,
2005 [hereinafter Induced Abortion], http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-inducedabortion.html;
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There is thus a disconnect between the media speculation that the
Supreme Court may be "poised to overrule Roe v. Wade" and the real
world in which American women live their lives. Women under fifty
came of age at a time when women had the right to choose to end an
unwanted pregnancy by a safe and legal abortion. Every day in America
some women faced with an unwanted pregnancy choose to have an
abortion while a like number of women choose to continue their
pregnancy. A woman's right to choose is a part of the value acceptances
of American society today. I strongly suspect that a clear majority of
Americans would support a woman's right to choose to have an abortion
during the first nine to twelve weeks of pregnancy, which is when most
abortions take place. 18 Less than 1% of abortions are performed after
twenty-four weeks, 19 presumably to protect the life or health of the
woman. I would assume that many of the abortions performed between
ten and twenty-four weeks are because ultrasound or genetic testing has
revealed that the woman is carrying a seriously defective fetus, and here
too I strongly suspect that a clear majority of Americans would support
the woman's right to choose in this very difficult situation. In other
words, when it comes to the crucial issue of the woman's right to chose
to have an abortion in the circumstances where in fact American woman
do chose to have an abortion-as opposed to peripheral issues such as
parental consent or notification or a ban on so-called "partial birth
abortion"-I maintain that a clear majority of Americans would support
a woman's right to choose to end a pregnancy by a safe and legal
abortion. It is my submission then, that a woman's right to choose is a
part of the value acceptances of American society today.2 °
see also LAWRENCE B. FINER & STANLEY K. HENSHAW, ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., ESTIMATES OF
U.S.
ABORTION
INCIDENCE
IN
2001
AND
2002
(May
18,
2005),

http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2005/05/18/ab-incidence.pdf. The Report shows that there has
been a decline of the number of abortions from the 1.6 million peak in 1990 to the 1.3 million range
from 1997 to the present. Approximately one-quarter of the total pregnancies each year end in
abortion. Induced Abortion, supra. See the summary of the Report in Nasseem Sowti, With High
Court Debate Brewing, New Report Shows Procedure's Numbers Down, WASH. POST, July 19,

2005, at FO.
18. See InducedAbortion, supra note 17.
19. See id.
20. If I am correct in my submission that a woman's right to choose is a part of the value
acceptances of American society today, then it may be queried how I explain the fact that abortion
is the subject of great political controversy in that society. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that
what may be called a "substantial minority" of Americans is strongly opposed to abortion, that this
"substantial minority" is very-well organized into a number of "pro-life" groups, and that this
"substantial minority" has pretty much co-opted the Republican Party on this issue. Specifically, the
Republican Party on the national level and in all but a handful of very "blue" states such as New
York and California, supports the "pro-life" agenda, and will strive to bring about the enactment of
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The Supreme Court is not going to take that choice away from
American women, no matter who joins its ranks. The Supreme Court is
not going to overrule Roe v. Wade.

"anti-abortion" laws. See Michael Hill, Why Overturning Roe v. Wade Could Cost Republicans
Votes Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A3. Republican Presidents also support the "prolife" agenda and take whatever actions they can to restrict abortion, such as to refuse to contribute
funds to international family planning programs that are not "anti-abortion." See Julia L. Ernst et al.,
The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing Women 's Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on
the IncreasinglyAnti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 774-77 (2004).
Also, in the political arena the issue of abortion does not arise in the context of a woman's
right to obtain an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy or to avoid giving birth to a seriously
defective fetus. Rather the issue arises in the context of "anti-abortion" regulation that often enjoys
broad public support, such as parental consent or notification or a ban on so-called "partial birth"
abortion or a ban on Medicaid funding for abortions for indigent women. See Kathryn Kolbert, Two
Steps Forwardand One Step Back, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 686, 686-89 (2004). Legislators who find
it "politically easy" to vote for these "anti-abortion" laws might find it more difficult to vote for an
"anti-abortion" law imposing severe restrictions on the circumstances in which a woman could
obtain a safe and legal abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.
One of the other reasons why abortion continues to be the subject of great political
controversy in American society today is that the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" lawyers litigate the
peripheral questions of abortion regulation with the same intensity as the "pro-life" and "prochoice" lawyers litigated the Roe v. Wade constellation of cases thirty plus years ago. Apparently,
the "pro-life" lawyers believe that if they can prevail in the peripheral abortion regulation cases, this
will somehow "chip away" at Roe v. Wade, so that the case will eventually "fall of its own weight."
It appears that the "pro-choice" lawyers may share the same view about the "chipping away" effect
of these cases and so litigate them with equal intensity. Or it may be that ideologically based
lawyers, as the "pro-life" and the "pro-choice" lawyers, including the author, necessarily are, always
have the need to litigate constitutional cases at a high level of intensity.
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